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Abstract
I consider an oligopoly model where, prior to price competition, firms invest in persuasive
advertising and induce brand loyalty in consumers who would otherwise buy the cheapest
alternative on the market. This setting, in which persuasive advertising is introduced to ho-
mogenous product markets, provides an alternative explanation for price dispersion phenom-
ena. Despite ex-ante symmetry, the equilibrium profile of advertising outlays is asymmetric.
It follows that endogenously determined brand loyal consumer bases are not symmetric across
firms. This raises a robustness question regarding Varian’s "model of sales" where symmetry
is exogenously assumed.
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1 Introduction
Significant amounts of money are spent every year on advertising. The largest 100 advertisers in
the US laid out a total of USD 90.31 billion on advertising in 2003 (see Advertising Age, June 28,
2004). Noticeably, in many advertising-intensive markets the products are nearly homogenous.
This suggests that advertising could be used to redistribute buyers amongst sellers and not (only)
to increase demand. Scherer and Ross (1990) note: “[d]ouble-blind experiments have repeatedly
demonstrated that consumers cannot consistently distinguish premium from popular-priced beer
brands, but exhibit definite preferences for the premium brands when labels are affixed-correctly
or not”. Although a vast literature spans the economics of advertising (see Bagwell, 2005), there
are only a few theoretical models of persuasive advertising in non-differentiated good markets.
This article models homogenous product markets where persuasive advertising creates sub-
jective product differentiation and changes the nature of subsequent price competition. In
particular, it studies the strategic effect of persuasive advertising in a two-stage oligopoly model
where firms compete in non-price advertising and prices. Advertising induces brand loyalty in
consumers who would otherwise purchase the cheapest alternative on the market. Firms first
invest in advertising, and then compete in prices for the remaining brand indifferent consumers.
Despite a priori symmetry of the firms the advertising levels chosen by the firms are asymmetric
in all subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game. One firm chooses a lower advertising
level, while the other firms choose the same, higher level. In all pricing equilibria, at least
two firms randomize on prices. The low advertiser prices more aggressively than the heavy
advertisers in expected terms. The firms counterbalance their advertising and pricing decisions.
A related strand of literature deals with price dispersion phenomena in homogenous product
markets.1 Varian (1980) constructs a "model of sales" where coexistence of fully informed
and uninformed consumers results in equilibrium price dispersion. The uninformed (captured)
consumers are evenly distributed across firms. The pricing stage in the current model is a
modification of the model of sales, with asymmetric bases of captured consumers. In a variant
of the model of sales, Rosenthal (1980) observes the existence of asymmetric pricing equilibria
with at least two firms randomizing. Baye et al. (1992) fully characterize the asymmetric
equilibria in the symmetric model of Varian. The current model builds up on a generalization
of these results to asymmetric consumer bases. The two-stage game considered offers a way
1Baye et al. (forth.) review the literature on price dispersion in homogenous product markets, including
clearinghouse models for virtual markets like Baye and Morgan (2001). The present setting also relates to online
markets. With price-comparison sites, firms have incentives to engage (prior to price competition) in costly
search-frustration activities, see Ellison and Ellison (2001).
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of endogenizing consumers’ heterogeneity. It turns out that the symmetric outcome does not
obtain, raising a robustness question regarding Varian’s (1980) symmetric model.
The model offers a new perspective on the coexistence of price dispersion and advertising,
taking a persuasive as opposed to an informative view of the latter. The advertising asymmetry
prediction reconciles simple theoretical modelling with the empirical facts. Much empirical work
explores whether homogenous goods advertising is informative (increases industry demand) or
is persuasive (affects selective/brand demand). The results are often contradictory, and vary
across industries. Kelton and Kelton (1982) and Baltagi and Levin (1986) support the persuasive
view in US brewery and cigarette industries, respectively.2 Bagwell (2005) provides an up-to-
date review of both empirical and theoretical studies on advertising.
The persuasive view of advertising goes back to Kaldor (1950). Friedman (1983) and
Schmalensee (1976) deal with oligopoly models where advertising increases selective demand.3
The latter explores the role of promotional competition in differentiated oligopoly markets where
price changes are infrequent. In a model where advertising creates vertical differentiation, Sutton
(1991) points out that differences in consumer tastes lead to the existence of two-tier markets.
His study of the frozen-food industry illustrates the emergence of dual structures (where high-
advertisers coexist with non-advertisers) in advertising-intensive markets. The current model
also results in a two-tier structure.
A seminal article by Stigler (1961) reveals the role of price advertising in homogenous product
markets. Butters (1977), Robert and Stahl (1993), McAfee (1994), and Roy (2000) link price
dispersion models to informative advertising that targets consumers who face (possibly infinite)
search costs. My model explores the use of non-price advertising in homogenous product
markets. In a closely related paper, Baye and Morgan (2004) examine endogenous loyalty
created by persuasive advertising, but through the lens of a model where price advertising
decisions are also endogenized.4 Costly price advertising is at the heart of two major differences:
Price dispersion persists even in the limit and, importantly, the equilibrium is symmetric. In
contrast, ruling out price advertising and allowing for a more general persuasive advertising
technology, the current model results in asymmetric advertising levels. This simple framework
matches empirical findings.
2Lee and Tremblay (1992) find no evidence that advertising promotes beer consumption in the US. Nelson and
Moran (1995) conclude that advertising serves to reallocate brand sales across alcoholic beverages.
3Von der Fehr and Stevik (1998) and Bloch and Manceau (1999) analyze the role of persuasive advertising in
differentiated duopoly markets. Tremblay and Polasky (2002) show how persuasive advertising may affect price
competition in a duopoly with no real product differentiation.
4 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out the relation with Baye and Morgan (2004) and for
providing valuable intuition for the asymmetric advertising equilibrium.
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The key intuition for the emergence of asymmetric advertising equilibria is the following.
At a potential symmetric profile of equilibrium advertising levels, the profit function of a firm
has a kink. A unilateral deviation to a slightly higher advertising level does not alter a firm’s
profit which equals monopoly profit on its loyal base. To the contrary, a unilateral deviation
to a slightly lower advertising level makes a firm’s profit jump from its monopoly profits on the
loyal base. By choosing a lower advertising level, the firm commits to be an aggressive player
in the second stage. The discrete jump in its probability of winning the indifferent consumer
base leads to an increase in its profits. As a result, the right and left derivatives of a firm’s profit
evaluated at a symmetric advertising profile cannot be simultaneously equal to zero. It follows
that equilibrium advertising levels are asymmetric.
Section 2 describes the model, while section 3 presents the equilibrium in the pricing stage.
Section 4 derives the equilibrium emerging in the advertising stage, and defines the outcome of
the sequential game. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the setting and present some concluding remarks.
All proofs missing from the text are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
There are n firms selling a homogenous product. All firms have the same constant marginal
cost. In the first period, firms choose simultaneously and independently their advertising
expenditure levels and, in the second period, they compete in prices. Each firm promotes
its product to induce subjective differentiation and brand loyalty. Let αi be the advertising
expenditure chosen by firm i. The fraction of consumers that are loyal to firm i depends on the
advertising expenditure profile. After the first stage, the advertising choices become common
knowledge.
In the second stage, firm i chooses the set of prices that are assigned positive density in
equilibrium and the corresponding density function. The price charged by a firm is a draw from
its price distribution. Let Fi (p) be the distribution function of firm i ∈ N = {1, 2, ... n}.
There is a continuum of consumers, with total measure 1, who purchase one unit of the
good whenever its price does not exceed a common reservation value r. Following advertising,
some consumers remain indifferent between the alternatives (either because advertising did not
reach them, or because it did not convince them) while the remainder become loyal to one brand
or another. The indifferent consumers view the alternatives on the market as perfect substitutes
and all purchase from the lowest price firm. The size of each group is determined by the total
advertising investment in the market. The total number of loyal consumers, U, is assumed to be
a strictly increasing and concave function of the aggregate advertising expenditure of the firms,
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U = U (Σiαi) , with limΣiαi→∞
U (Σiαi) = 1. There is empirical evidence of diminishing returns
to scale in advertising (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Bagwell, 2005). With higher advertising, more
consumers join the captured (loyal) group. One may think that more advertising would be more
convincing. The captured consumers are split amongst the firms according to a market sharing
function depending on the advertising expenditures of the firms.5 Following Schmalensee (1976),
let this fraction be Si (αi, α−i) = Si ∈ [0, 1], satisfying the following properties:
1.
nP
i=1
Si = 1;
2. ∂Si∂αi ≥ 0 with strict inequality if ∃j 6= i such that αj > 0 or if αj = 0, for all j;
3. ∂Si∂αj ≤ 0 with strict inequality if αi > 0;
4. Si (αi, 0) = 1 if αi > 0;
5. Si (0, α−i) = 0 if ∃j 6= i such that αj > 0 and S (0, 0) = 0;
6. Si (αi, α−i) is homogenous of degree 0;
7. Si (α,α−i) = Sj (α, α−j) , ∀i, j ∈ N, whenever α−j is obtained from α−i by permutation.
It follows from above that all loyal consumers are split amongst the firms with positive
advertising levels (1, 4 and 5). The market share of a firm increases in its own advertising,
whenever it is below 1, and decreases in rival advertising, whenever it is above 0 (2 and 3). The
share profile remains unaffected by scaling all advertising by the same factor. Note that scaling
up all advertising expenditures leads to an increase in the size of the loyal market, although
firms’ relative shares do not change. The market share of a firm depends on rivals’ advertising
levels and not on their identities. The market sharing function is symmetric across firms. An
example of a market share function satisfying these conditions is S (αi, α−i) = α
a
i
Σjαaj
, a > 0.
Finally, the remaining consumers form the indifferent base, denominated by I. Hence,
each firm faces the indifferent base I = 1 − U (Σiαi) and a particular captured or locked-in
base Ui = Si (αi, α−i)U (Σiαi). Firms cannot price discriminate between these two types of
consumers.
The timing of the game can be justified by the fact that I deal with non-price advertising.
Firms build-up a brand identity through advertising investment. A change in brand advertis-
ing takes time, whereas firms can modify their prices frequently. The subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is derived by solving backwards the two stage advertising-pricing game.
5 I model captured consumers as a share of total loyals. Alternatively, one can directly define the loyal base
of firm i as Ui (αi, α−i) ≥ 0, satisfying the appropriate assumptions. (See Section 4 for more details.) Then,
U =
S
i
Ui (αi, α−i) < 1 should hold.
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3 The Pricing Stage
In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose their advertising investments. In the second
stage, knowing the whole profile of advertising outlays, firms choose prices. Without loss of
generality, assume that the loyal bases satisfy Ui ≥ Uj whenever i ≤ j with i, j ∈ N . Firms
compete for the brand switchers, I = 1−ΣiUi. The tension between the incentives to undercut
in order to win the indifferent market and those to extract surplus from the loyals leads to the
non-existence of pure strategy equilibria. Baye, et al. (1992) prove this result and characterize
all mixed strategy equilibria of the asymmetric game.6 Restricting attention to equilibria with
convex supports, Proposition 1 directly follows from their analysis. For any firm i ∈ N, only the
prices in the interval Ai = [Li, r] are relevant, with Li − c ≥ (r−c)UiI+Ui . Pricing at pi < Li, firms
would make profits below minmax level and, pricing at pi > r, firms would make zero profits.
Let L−c = (r−c)Un−1I+Un−1 and consider the functions G(p) = 1−
h
(r−p)Un−1
I(p−c)
i h
L(I+Un)
I(p−c) −
Un
I
i 1−m
m
and
H(p) = 1−
h
(L−c)(I+Un)
I(p−c) −
Un
I
i 1
m , where m = |M | and ∅ ⊂M ⊆ N \ {n}. In Proposition 1, M
is the set of firms other than n that randomize at equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If Ui ≥ Uj for i ≤ j and M = {n− 1} , the following distribution functions
represent a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the pricing subgame (Ai, πi; i ∈ N) :
Fn (p) =



0 for p < L
G(p) for L ≤ p < r
1 for p ≥ r
, Fn−1 (p) =



0 for p < L
H(p) for L ≤ p < r
1 for p ≥ r
and
Fk (p) =



0 for p < r
1 for p ≥ r
for ∀k < n− 1.
If firms employ convex supports, this is the unique equilibrium that applies to any weakly ordered
profile of loyal bases. If Ui = U for i ≤ n − 1, Un < U, and |M | ≥ 2, then Fn (p) , Fj (p) =
Fn−1 (p) for j ∈ M and Fk (p) for k ∈ N \ {{n} ∪M}, are a family of pricing equilibria with
more than two firms randomizing.
Proposition 1 presents multiple equilibria for specific advertising profiles. However, for any
such profile all equilibria are outcome-equivalent, i.e. the profits of the firms are invariant across
the equilibria.
6Klemperer (1987) notes the emergence of mixed strategy equilibria when consumers with zero and positive
switching costs coexist.
6
Proposition 2 Let Ui ≥ Uj whenever i ≤ j and I = 1 − ΣiUi, i, j ∈ N . The expected profits
(gross of advertising outlays) in all second stage Nash equilibria are:
Eπj = (r − c)Uj , ∀j ∈ N \ {n} and Eπn = (L− c) (Un + I) = (r − c)Vn,
where Vn = Un−1( Un+IUn−1+I ).
In all second stage equilibria at least two firms randomize on prices. In one limiting equi-
librium, all other firms choose monopoly pricing. This is the unique equilibrium that applies
to any arbitrary profile of loyal bases. This equilibrium predicts significant price dispersion in
relatively small markets. The higher the number of competitors, the lower the chances of an
individual firm to win the indifferent market. When concentration decreases, more firms pre-
fer to rely on their locked-in markets and act as monopolists rather than engage in aggressive
pricing. Narasimhan (1988) derived the pricing equilibrium in a model where two firms count
on loyal consumer bases and compete for brand switchers. In that context, pricing below the
monopoly level with positive probability is viewed as a price promotion. His model links price
dispersion in competitive markets to consumer switching. This section extends his setting to
oligopoly, when the switchers are extremely price sensitive. This limiting equilibrium points
out the inadequacy of this type of model in explaining market-wide price promotions in larger
oligopolies.
Baye and Morgan (2004) use a model where there are cross effects between price and brand
advertising. In contrast to Varian (1980) and the current model, they show that even in the
limit (when the number of firms is large) price dispersion persists. At equilibrium, costly price
advertising may occur only if a finite number of firms post ads. Then, at least some firms count
on (non-vanishing) loyal bases even in the limit.
When Ui = U for i ≤ n − 1 and Un ≤ U , there exists another limiting pricing equilibrium
with all firms randomizing over the same convex support. In all equilibria, if Un < Un−1, then
firm n randomizes differently. It prices more aggressively in order to increase its chances of
winning the indifferent consumers. This allows to partially offset its loyal base disadvantage.
In his symmetric setting, Rosenthal (1980) points out that a decrease in market concentration
leads to a higher price. Stahl (1989) obtains the same result with endogenous information
acquisition, which is costless for a fraction of the consumers referred to as shoppers, and costly
for the others. As the number of firms increases, the firms compete for the same number of
shoppers and the incentives to undercut prices are lower. The pricing stage of the current model
supports Rosenthal’s finding in a more general asymmetric setting. It is however important to
note that here the total market size is fixed and the positive concentration-price relationship
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does not necessarily hold as the size of both the indifferent consumer group and the loyal base of
each firm are endogenously determined. In Rosenthal (1980), an increase in the number of firms
does not alter the number of indifferent consumers and it brings in equally sized loyal groups
attached to the entrants.
Extending the "model of sales", Baye, et al. (1992) construct a metagame in which consumers
are also players. In the first stage, uninformed consumers and firms move simultaneously. Firms
choose a price distribution and the uninformed consumers decide where to purchase. In the
second stage, the informed consumers choose an outlet. Given that the asymmetric price
distributions can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance, they show that the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive game is the symmetric one. This follows from the
equilibrium consistency requirement that a firm with higher expected price cannot have a larger
uninformed consumer base. In my model, only firms make decisions, and the subgame perfect
equilibria of the game are asymmetric. The next section proves this result.
4 Advertising Expenditure Choices
In this section, I derive the equilibrium of the reduced form game where the oligopolists si-
multaneously choose an advertising expenditure. Their payoffs are the profits emerging in the
pricing stage minus the advertising expenditure. Profits gross of advertising cost are given in
Proposition 2. Note that Vn = Un if Un = Un−1.
The loyal consumer group of firm i (Ui) is given by Ui (αi, α−i) = Si (αi, α−i)U (Σjαj).
The consumers who are not persuaded (or reached) by advertising form the brand indifferent
group (I = 1−
Pn
i=1 Ui (αi, α−i) = 1− U (Σiαi)) which buys the cheapest product. Under the
assumptions made so far, the size of the loyal group of a firm increases with that firm’s adver-
tising. The incremental consumers may derive from the brand indifferent group (U 0 (Σiαi) > 0)
or from rivals’ loyal groups
³
∂Si(αi,α−i)
∂αi ≥ 0
´
. The latter allows for reciprocal cancellation of
advertising across brands. See Bagwell (2005) for empirical evidence on this issue. An increase
in rival advertising has two conflicting effects on the loyal base of a firm. There is a positive
effect due to the increase in the total number of loyal consumers (U 0 (Σiαi) > 0) and a negative
one due to a decrease in the firm’s share of loyal consumers
³
∂Si(αi,α−i)
∂αj ≤ 0
´
. I assume that
the overall effect of rival advertising is negative.
A1: ∂
2Ui
∂α2i
< 0, ∂2Ui∂α2i ≤
∂2Ui
∂αi∂αj for i, j < n and
∂2Vn
∂α2n
< 0 and ∂Ui∂αi (0, 0) >
1
r−c .
A2: ∂
2Ui
∂αi∂αj ≤ 0,
∂2Vn
∂αn∂αj ≤ 0.
Assumptions A1 and A2 guarantee the existence of equilibrium.
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With αn ≤ αn−1 ≤ ... ≤ α1, firm j 6= n maximizes its profit net of advertising expenditure:
πj = (r − c)SjU (Σiαi)− αj = πH .
Firm n maximizes its expected profit net of advertising costs:
πn = (r − c)Sn−1U (Σiαi)
(SnU (Σiαi) + I)
(Sn−1U (Σiαi) + I)
− αn = πL.
Notice that πH = πL when αn = αn−1. The FOC of the maximization problems above implicitly
define α∗n (α−n) and α∗j (α−j) for j ∈ N \ {n}. For a symmetric equilibrium α∗ to exist, firm n
should not have incentives to decrease its advertising from α∗n, while the other firms should not
have incentives to increase, their advertising from α∗j .
∂πn
∂αn
¡
α∗, α∗−n
¢
≥ 0 and ∂πj∂αj
¡
α∗, α∗−j
¢
≤ 0 for all j ∈ N \ {n} .
In the appendix I show that this requirement leads to a contradiction. Together with the
optimization problem above, this proves the following result.
Proposition 3 Under A1, in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the reduced form advertising
game, αn < αi = αj for ∀i, j ∈ NÂ {n}. The values of αn and αi (∀i ∈ NÂ {n}) are implicitly
defined by the FOCs.
The following example illustrates that a symmetric advertising profile cannot form part of
an equilibrium.
Example 1 Let Si (αi, α−i) = αiΣjαj for ∀i ∈ N, U (Σjαj) =
Σjαj
1+Σjαj , n = 2, r > 1 and c = 0.
7
Then at α1 = α2 = α, the symmetric payoffs are given by πS1 = πS2 = r α1+2α − α. For
r <
¡
1+2α
α
¢2
(1 + α) , firm 1 has incentives to deviate to αL1 = α
q
r
1+α − (1 + α) < α. For
r ≥
¡
1+2α
α
¢2
(1 + α) , firm 1 has incentives to deviate to αH1 =
p
r (1 + α)− (1 + α) > α.8
A1 requires that ∂
2Ui
∂α2i
≤ ∂2Ui∂αi∂αj . This guarantees that, given αn, firms i, j ∈ NÂ {n} choose
αi = αj at equilibrium (see Vives, 1999) and allows the equilibrium outcome to be fully defined.
Without this restriction, more general asymmetries may arise at equilibrium. However, αn < αi
for ∀i ∈ NÂ {n} in any reduced form game equilibrium.
7The sharing rule in the example, Si (αi, α−i) = αiΣjαj might be interpreted as the probability that an arbitrary
loyal consumer chooses firm i. This probability is nonincreasing in i and thus a firm with higher advertising is
more likely to be chosen by a loyal consumer.
8π1

αL1 , α

− πS1 (α,α) = (1 + 2α)−1
k
α
t
r
1+α − (1 + 2α)
l2
> 0 and π1

αH1 , α

− πS1 (α,α) =
(1 + 2α)−1
k
α
s
r (1 + α)− (1 + 2α)
l2
> 0.
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Proposition 4 Under A1 and A2, the advertising outlays in Proposition 3, together with any
of the pricing strategy profiles in Proposition 1 give the subgame perfect equilibria of the two
stage game.
To see the role played by submodularity (A2), consider a duopoly. Let (α1, α2) with α1 > α2
be a candidate equilibrium. As ∂πH∂αH (α1, α2) = 0, if firm 2 deviates to α ≥ α1 its profits
fall. For ∀α ≥ α1, its marginal profit is ∂πH∂αH (α, α1) <
∂πH
∂αH (α1, α1) ≤
∂πH
∂αH (α1, α2) = 0.
The first inequality follows from strict concavity and the second from submodularity. Then
πH (α,α1) < πH (α1, α1) = πL (α1, α1) ≤ πL (α2, α1). A symmetric argument can be used
to show that firm 1 does not have an incentive to deviate to α ≤ α2. A general proof for
an arbitrary number of firms is provided in the Appendix. However, A2 is sufficient but
not necessary for an asymmetric equilibrium to exist. This can be easily seen in Example 1.
For r − c = 16, the candidate equilibrium is (α1, α2) = (3.94, 2.15). Firm 1 does not have
incentives to leapfrog firm 2: its profits on [0, 2.15] are maximized at 1.7, and π1 (1.7, 2.15) =
4.38 < π1 (3.94, 2.15) = 4.95. Firm 2 does not have incentives to leapfrog firm 1: its profits
on [3.94, ∞) are maximized at 3.95, and π2 (3.95, 3.94) = 3.15 < π2 (2.15, 3.94) = 3.52. The
best response graph is presented in the Appendix.9
Other models that yield such asymmetric equilibria can be found in McAffee (1994) and Amir
and Wooders (2000). In these models (as in the present one), payoff functions are submodular
and best response functions jump down over the diagonal in a n − 1 symmetric best response
mapping.
The asymmetric equilibrium follows from the fact that firms weigh their first and second
stage decisions. A larger first stage investment triggers less aggressive second stage pricing,
while a lower investment supposes a more aggressive pricing strategy. Although they are initially
identical, at equilibrium, firms choose asymmetric advertising outlays. This asymmetry is linked
to the choice of mixed pricing strategies. There is one firm with a strictly lower advertising
level (firm n in the example) and with the lowest loyal group. All other firms choose the same
higher level of advertising and have equal larger loyal consumer bases. In Example 1, the low
advertiser makes profits net of advertising cost lower than its rival, but this may not be true in
general. The firm with the smallest loyal group prices more aggressively, has highest probability
of being the winner of the indifferent market, and makes the lowest gross expected profits. All
other firms price less aggressive and all make profits gross of advertising expenditure that are
equal to the monopoly profit on their loyal market.
9 I use Example 1 for computational convenience. Though well defined, it satisfies A1, but not A2. An example
satisfying both A1 and A2 for n = 2 is Si (αi, α−i) = α
1/6
i
Σiα
1/6
i
for ∀i ∈ N, U (Σiαi) = Σiα
1/6
i
1+Σiα
1/6
i
.
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In the remainder of this section I offer a possible microfoundation for the demand system
considered. It applies to the case of a duopoly. A random utility model can lead to the
proportional market sharing function Si = αiΣjαj used in the examples, when consumers respond
to advertising and prices, but are short-sighted. With a duopoly there is a unique mixed pricing
equilibrium where both firms randomize, and E (pi | pi < r) = E (pj | pj < r) , where pi is the
price of firm i. In the marketing literature, price dispersion models are used to explain price
promotions. The expected price conditional on a brand being priced below r is interpreted as
the average discounted price, while 1 − F (r) measures the frequency of discounts. Assuming
that loyal consumers are myopic and care only about the average discount and advertising, the
proportional market sharing function, Si = αiΣjαj , can be derived from a random utility model.
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5 Discussion
While there is no doubt that advertising plays an important informative role in the economy, oc-
casions in which it does not provide any relevant information on price or product characteristics
are not less relevant. In many homogenous product markets, advertising only serves to redis-
tribute consumers among the sellers. Many advertising campaigns have rather an emotional
content and try to attract consumers by associating the product with attitudes or feelings that
have no relevant relationship to the product or its consumption. Commenting on Chevrolet’s
1988 “Heartbeat of America” TV ads for automobiles, G.M.’s advertising executive Sean Fitz-
patrick observed that they “may look disorganized, but every detail is cold-heartedly calculated.
People see the scenes they want to identify with. [...] It’s not verbal. It’s not rational. It’s emo-
tional, just the way people buy cars” (see Scherer and Ross 1990 p. 573, originally from “On the
Road again, with a Passion”, New York Times October 10th, 1988.) Referring to the new trends
in television advertising, James Twitchell, Professor of advertising at the University of Florida,
noted that “Advertising is becoming art. You don’t need it, but it’s fun to look at” (see Herald
Tribune, January 10, 2003, p. 7). Loewenstein (2001) remarks “[w]hile conventional models
of decision making can make sense of advertisements that provide information about products
(whether informative or misleading), much advertising- for example, depicting happy, attractive
friends drinking Coca-Cola seem to have little informational content. Instead such advertis-
ing seems to be intended to create mental associations that operate in both directions, causing
one to think that one should be drinking Coca-Cola if one is with friends (by evoking a choice
heuristic) and to infer one that one must be having fun if one is drinking Coca-Cola (playing on
10Consumers have idiosyncratic preferences over the brands and each consumer chooses the one that has the
greatest brand advertising-average discounted price differential (see Anderson et al. (1992)).
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the difficulty of evaluating one’s hedonic state).” See also Camerer et al. (forthcoming).
Persuasive advertising could be a way to influence such categorization through mental asso-
ciations. Pepsi’s 1997 GeneratioNext campaign defines itself as being “about everything that
is young and fresh, a celebration of the creative spirit. It is about the kind of attitude that
challenges the norm with new ideas, at every step of the way”. Perrier significantly strength-
ened its position in the French mineral water market with its advertising campaign directed at
the younger generation, under the slogan “Perrier c’est fou” (“Perrier is crazy”). This created
a perception of the product as being very fashionable (see Sutton, 1991). Even more relevant
is the subsequent Perrier campaign under the meaningless slogan “Ferrier c’est pou”. These
considerations support the persuasive view of advertising and offer a justification for the stylized
setting considered here.
The present analysis suggests that high advertisers tend to have higher prices. Often, blind
tests show that consumers perceive highly advertised brands as different. The model also
predicts the existence of a group of heavy advertisers and of a low advertiser. This is consistent
with the empirical evidence that markets with significant advertising have a two-tier structure.
Several extensions to this work are worth mentioning. A major limitation of the present
model is the extreme post-advertising heterogeneity of consumers: loyal consumers are extremely
responsive to advertising, while the indifferent ones continue to be extremely price sensitive.
One may consider a smoother distribution of advertising-induced switching costs. Moreover,
indifferent consumers are assumed to be aware about the existence of all products. Perhaps it
is more realistic to assume that the indifferent consumers know only the prices of some sellers.
6 Conclusions
The present article proposes a way to model the effects of persuasive advertising on price com-
petition in a homogenous product market. In a two stage game, an oligopoly first invests in
persuasive advertising and, then, competes in prices. Advertising results in the creation of loyal
consumer groups attached to the firms. The model predicts asymmetric advertising outlays de-
spite the initial symmetry of firms. This finding matches the empirical evidence in advertising
intensive markets. The setting shows how persuasive advertising may be used to relax price
competition, and links it to equilibrium price dispersion.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an advertising equilibrium,
α∗ = (α∗1, ...α∗n) with the two lowest advertising outlays equal (α∗n−1 = α∗n). By assumption A1,
∃α∗i > 0 for some i. Consider first α∗n−1 = α∗n > 0. Then, the marginal profit for a downward
deviation of firm n and an upward deviation of firm n−1 should be both equal to zero. Consid-
ering the profit expressions in Proposition 2 and letting Un−1(α∗) = Un(α∗) = U, the marginal
profits corresponding to these deviations are given by:
∂πn−1
∂αn−1
(α∗) = (r − c)∂Un−1∂αn−1
(α∗)− 1 and
∂πn
∂αn
(α∗) = (r − c)(∂Un−1∂αn
(α∗) + U
∂Un
∂αn (α
∗)− ∂Un−1∂αn (α
∗)
U + 1− U (α∗)
)− 1.
Notice that ∂Un−1∂αn−1 (α
∗) = ∂Un∂αn (α
∗).
Then, ∂πn−1∂αn−1 (α
∗)− ∂πn∂αn (α
∗) = (r − c)
³
∂Un−1
∂αn−1 (α
∗)− ∂Un−1∂αn (α
∗)
´³
1−U(α∗)
U+1−U(α∗)
´
.
Since α∗n > 0, it follows that
∂Un−1
∂αn−1 (α
∗) > 0 and ∂Un−1∂αn (α
∗) < 0. Also U(α∗) < 1, and a
contradiction is obtained as ∂πn−1∂αn−1 (α
∗) > ∂πn∂αn (α
∗).
It follows that α∗n < α∗n−1in any equilibrium where α∗n > 0.
Next consider α∗n−1 = α∗n = 0. Then, it must hold that
∂πn−1
∂αn−1 (α
∗) ≤ 0. Recall that by A1,
∂2Ui
∂α2i
< 0 and ∂2Ui∂α2i ≤
∂2Ui
∂αi∂αj . As α
∗
i > 0 = α∗n−1, it follows that ∂πi∂αi (α
∗) < ∂πn−1∂αn−1 (α
∗) ≤ 0. But,
then α∗i = 0. A contradiction. I conclude that α∗n < α∗n−1 in equilibrium.
Finally, consider i < j < n, the FOC imply ∂Ui∂αi −
1
r−c = 0 and
∂Uj
∂αj −
1
r−c = 0. By A1 αi > αj
implies ∂Ui∂αi <
∂Uj
∂αj . Since αi ≥ αj , it follows that αi = αj should hold for i, j 6= n. This
establishes that αn < αn−1 = ... = α1 in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. To make sure that the candidate maximum defines the first
stage strategies in a subgame perfect equilibrium, firm j = 1, ...n− 1 should not have incentives
to leapfrog firm n, and firm n should not have incentives to leapfrog its rivals.
Let α∗i be the equilibrium choice of firm i ∈ NÂ {n} , α∗n be the equilibrium choice of firm n and
α∗ ∈ Rn−2 be the vector of equilibrium choices if firms j ∈ NÂ {i, n}. πi,1 is the own partial
derivative of firm i’s profit function.
Consider firm n. Its profits are:
πn (α, α∗i , α∗) =



(r − c)Vn (α, α∗i , α∗)− α = πLn (α,α∗i , α∗) if α ≤ α∗i
(r − c)Un (α, α∗i , α∗)− α = πHn (α, α∗i , α∗) if α > α∗i
,
where α is the choice of firm n.
Consider the case α > α∗i , then the following is true:
0 = πHn,1 (α∗i , α∗n, α∗) > πHn,1 (α, α∗n, α∗) ≥ πHn,1 (α, α∗i , α∗). The first inequality follows from strict
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concavity (A1) and the second from submodularity of Un (A2). Then, firm n has incentives to
decrease.
When α ≤ α∗i , the profit function is concave and, hence, maximized at α = α∗n.
Consider firm j ∈ NÂ {n}. Its profits are:
πj (α, α∗n, α∗) =



(r − c)Uj (α, α∗n, α∗)− α = πHj (α,α∗n, α∗) if α ≥ α∗n
(r − c)Vj (α, α∗n, α∗)− α = πLj (α, α∗n, α∗) if α < α∗n
,
where Vj (α, α∗n, α∗) = Un (α∗n, α, α∗)
Uj(α,α∗n,α∗)+I
Un(α∗n,α,α∗)+I
and α is the choice of firm j.
Consider α < α∗n, then the following is true:
0 = πLj,1 (α∗n, α∗i , α∗) < πLj,1 (α, α∗i , α∗) ≤ πLj,1 (α,α∗n, α∗) .
The first inequality follows from strict concavity (A1) and the second from submodularity of Vj
(A2). Then, firm j has incentives to increase. When α ≥ α∗n, the profit function is strictly
concave and, hence, maximized at α = α∗j .
Example 1 Best response functions for r − c = 16.
Given rival’s choice α, firm i’s best response would be αHi (α) = 4 (1 + α)
1
2 − (1 + α) if it
chose αi ≥ α and would be αLi (α) = 4α (1 + α)
− 1
2 − (1 + α) if it chose αi < α.
The corresponding profits are:
πi (α) =



πHi (α) = 16− 8 (1 + α)
1
2 + (1 + α) for αi ≥ α
πLi (α) = 16α (1 + α)
−1 − 8α (1 + α)−
1
2 + (1 + α) for αi < α
.
Since πHi (α) ≥ πLi (α)⇔ α ≤ 3, the best response of firm i is αi (α) =



αHi (α) for α ≤ 3
αLi (α) for α > 3
and it has a jump down at α = 3.
53.752.51.250
5
3.75
2.5
1.25
0
alpha 1
alpha 2
Figure 1: Best response functions in Example 1 for r − c = 16.
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